The paper analyses the evolvement and effects of central bank crisis management since the mid 1980s based on a Hayek-Mises-Wicksell overinvestment framework. It is shown that, given that the traditional transmission mechanism between monetary policy and consumer price inflation has collapsed, asymmetric monetary policy crisis management implies a convergence of interest rates towards zero and a gradual expansion of central bank balance sheets. From a Hayek-MisesWicksell perspective asymmetric central bank crisis management has contributed to financial market bubbles, decreasing marginal efficiency of investment, increasing income inequality and declining growth dynamics. The economic policy implication is a slow but decisive exit from ultra-expansionary monetary policies. JEL-Codes: E520, E580, F420, E630.
Introduction
At the latest with the US subprime crisis and the European financial and debt crisis, the central banks of the large industrialized countries are widely understood as key players in (financial) crisis management. With large financial institutions tumbling, threatening to trigger a melt-down in the global financial system, decisive interest rate cuts and ample liquidity provisions have become standard tools to ensure financial and economic stability.
Since the mid 1980s, the asymmetric nature of monetary policy crisis management -i.e. a stronger monetary expansion during crisis than monetary tightening during the recovery after the boom -have led to a gradual decline of interest rates towards zero and an inflation of central bank balance sheets.
Because the structural decline of interest rates has been accompanied by low consumer price inflation, monetary policy crisis management was regarded for a long time as an outstanding success. With improved communication skills being assumed to ensure low inflation (Woodford 2003) , interest rates as operational target (or later the size of the central bank balance sheet) became popular tools to achieve additional goals such financial stability and growth. The outbreak of the US subprime crisis and the European financial and debt crisis have destroyed, however, the illusion of the Great Moderation (Bernanke 2005) . Now, the structural decline of the nominal and real interest rates is interpreted as response to a structural decline of growth dynamics, which are linked to a saving glut of ageing societies, declining (marginal efficiency of) investment and (exogenously) increasing income inequality (Gordon 2012 , Summers 2014 , von Weizsäcker 2014 .
The result is a declining -what Summers (2014) calls -natural interest rate, which involves an increasing probability of financial market bubbles, while product markets remain in equilibrium. Similarly, Laubach and Williams (2015) suggest that (in the US) the fall in trend GDP growth rates triggered a decline in the natural rate of interest, which implies that the gradual interest rate cuts of the Fed are an inevitable response to the secular stagnation. This explanation approach is in line with the literature, which sees financial crises as result of random or exogenous shocks, amplified by the irrationality of human action and therefore sees discretionary policy intervention as indispensable to stabilize inherently instable markets (Keynes 1936 , De Grauwe 2010 . Monetary policy has increasingly become the pivotal instrument of crisis management, because with high levels of government debt and growing dimension of crises, fiscal crisis management has reached its limits.
In contrast to the Keynesian views, monetary policy crisis management is discussed here from the point of view of the monetary overinvestment theories by Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1931 , which see too loose monetary policies as the origin of structural distortions and crises.
This view is line with assessments based on the Taylor (1993) Rule that suggest that too expansionary monetary policies during the 2000s sowed the seeds for financial exuberance and therefore the current crisis (see Taylor 2007 , Jorda et al. 2015 , Adrian and Shin (2008 , Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2014) as well as Hoffmann and Schnabl (2008 , 2016a ).
The approach is in many aspects similar to Borio's (2014) perception of the financial cycle, but takes a stronger focus on the role of central banks for crisis management. They extend Borio (2014) to the possible role of central banks for the emergence of crisis.
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Asymmetric Monetary Policy Patterns
To model the central bank crisis management emerging since the mid 1980s a Wicksell (1898), Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1931 based monetary overinvestment theory framework is used. This allows to understand asymmetric monetary policy crisis management patterns since the mid 1980s. 1 Whereas Borio (2014) takes the empirical observation of financial cycles as a starting points and matches it with the currently dominating business cycle theories, we take the seminal Austrian business cycle theory as starting points and match it with the observed stylized facts occurring in financial markets.
An Austrian Business Cycle Framework
Based on the business cycle theories of Wicksell, Mises and Hayek four types of interest rates can be distinguished: First, the internal interest rate i i which reflects the (expected) returns of (planned) investment projects. Second, Wicksell's (1898) natural interest rate n i is the interest rate that balances the supply (saving) and demand (investment) of capital (and thereby does neither cause inflation nor deflation). Third, the central bank interest rate cb i is the policy interest rate set by the central bank. It represents the interest rate which commercial banks are 1 The monetary overinvestment theories of Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929; fulfil the requirements for a theory of financial cycles as formulated by Borio (2014: 186-187) as follows: (1) The financial boom not only precedes the bust, it also causes the bust. (2) There is a capital overhang (i.e. overinvestment), which is related to debt overhang (unsustainable credit growth). (3) There is a notion of a sustainable level of output, with the deviation of realized output from sustainable output being related to monetary conditions. charged by the central bank for refinancing operations. Fourth, the capital market interest rate c i is defined as the interest rate set by the private banking (financial) sector for credit provided to private enterprises. For simplification it is assumed that under normal conditions the capital market interest rate equals the policy interest rate (see Hoffmann and Schnabl 2011 ).
Wicksell (1898) and Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1931 have different concepts of the natural interest rate.
According to Wicksell (1898) , the deviation of the central bank interest rate (and the capital market interest rate) from the natural rate of interest (which guarantees goods market equilibrium) disturbs the equilibrium between ex-ante saving and investment plans, bringing about inflationary (I>S) or deflationary processes (S>I). 2 During an inflationary credit boom, the supply of goods cannot satisfy the additional demand for goods at given prices. Therefore,
Wicksell's natural rate of interest is the interest rate at which inflation is zero (or at the target level (2003) ) the role of the production structure for the transmission of monetary policy to inflation.
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Building on Wicksell (1898), Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1931 aimed to explain business cycles caused by the deviation of the central bank interest rate (capital market interest rate) from the natural rate of interest. They attribute the main role in the creation of cycles to credit 2 Therefore, the theory of Wicksell can be seen as the foundation of inflation targeting frameworks. If the central bank adjusts successfully the central bank interest rate to the natural interest rate, the inflation rate will be zero. 3 "In other words, the real cause of the rise in prices is to be looked for, not in the expansion of the note issue as such, but in the provision by the bank of easier credit, which is itself the cause of the expansion." (Wicksell 1936: 87 (Wicksell 1936: 105) creation triggered by the central bank and the private banking sector. Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1931 emphasized the importance of the intertemporal misalignments of plans of producers and consumers to derive mal-or overinvestment 5 as mismatch between the production structure and consumer preferences. The natural interest rate is the interest rate that aligns saving and consumption preferences with the production structure over time. A fall in the central bank interest rate (capital market interest rate) below the natural interest rate causes a cumulative inflationary process, creating distortions in the production structure that later make an adjustment necessary (unless the central bank keeps on inflating credit at an ever-increasing pace and artificially prolongs the credit boom).
Figure 1: Equilibrium
An economy is in equilibrium when the natural rate of interest equals the central bank interest rate, i.e. planned savings equal investment. In the view of Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1931 an economic upswing starts when positive expectations -for instance due to an important innovation -raise the internal interest rate of investment, bringing about a rise in investment demand at given interest rates. 6 In Figure 1 this corresponds to a right shift of the 5 Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) used in German the word "Überinvestition" (in English: overinvestment). In the English literature on Austria business cycle theory the term "malinvestment" is more common. 
) as shown in the left panel of Figure 2 , relatively low interest rates will give rise to an unsustainable overinvestment boom. Holding policy rates too low (for too long) in the following will be referred to as monetary policy mistake of type 1.
Figure 2: Boom and Bust
To market participants a rise in credit to the private sector at constant interest rates signals that saving activity of households increased. Additional investment projects aim to satisfy the expected rise in future consumption. As planned household saving does not increase, an unsustainable disequilibrium between ex-ante saving and investment
In the following, additional investments of some enterprises trigger additional investments of other enterprises (cumulative upward process). As soon as capacity limits are reached and unemployment is low, wages and prices rise. At first, rising prices signal additional profits and therefore trigger a further increase in investment. There may be spill-overs to financial markets. Increases in expected profits of companies are typically associated with rising stock prices. Given relatively low interest rates on deposits, shares are an attractive investment class. When stock prices move upward, trendfollowers will provide extra momentum such that "the symptoms of prosperity themselves finally become […] a factor of prosperity" (Schumpeter 1912, p. 226) . 7 Consumption is fueled by rising stock prices via the wealth channel, which leads, with a lag, to an increasing price level.
The boom turns into bust, when the central bank increases the central bank interest rate to slow down inflation (Mises 1912; Hayek 1929; 1937) . Then, investment projects with an internal interest rate below the risen natural interest rate turn out to be unprofitable. The fall in investment of some firms will depress investment of other firms as expected returns Wages fall and unemployment rises.
In this situation, the central bank should cut the central bank interest rate to contain the downward-spiral. Yet, the central bank interest rate is kept too high. Figure 2 shows that when the policy interest rate is above the natural interest rate ( 
Asymmetric Monetary Policy Crisis Management Patterns
From the point of view of Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) notion Friedman and Schwartz (1963) as well as Bernanke (1995) argued that the US Fed had kept interest rates too tight during the early years of the 1930s world economic crisis, what they argue to have aggravated the crisis. 8 Similarly, the Bank of Japan was blamed to have kept the interest rate too high in the early years after the bursting of the Japanese bubble economy in December 1989 (Bernanke 2000 , Posen 2000 . With crisis more and more originating in financial markets and with inflation remaining at historically low levels, monetary policy was increasingly used as a tool of crisis management. 
Asymmetric Effects of Monetary Policy Crisis Management on Consumer and Asset Prices
Monetary policy as a tool of crisis management had since the mid 1980s several benefits.
Given that crises increasingly materialized as financial crises, central banks could respond fast, when the potential collapse of systemic financial institutions threatened to trigger ostensibly uncontrollable chain reactions. The large and further growing scales of rescue measures could be easily financed via base money creation. Governments remained (widely) spared from having to pass increasing costs of crisis management through the parliaments.
Whereas the fiscal costs of crisis management would have become visible in form of growing government debt, tax hikes or dire expenditure cuts, the costs of monetary crisis management are more difficult to trace and therefore more difficult to associate with policy mistakes (see section 4).
In particular, gradual interest rate cuts towards zero and unprecedented central bank balance sheet expansions ( 
Monetary Policy Crisis Management and Low Inflation
At the end of the 1970s, the notion that monetary policy could reduce unemployment via surprise inflation (Phillips curve effect) had proven to be misleading. Lucas (1976) showed that rational private agents adjust their behavior in a dynamic game situation to discretionary policy interventions. Central banks became regarded to be able to generate short-term employment effects, but at the cost of rising uncertainty and -in the long term -lower investment and growth. This paved the way for rules in monetary policy making, which intended to isolate central banks from the short-term goals of policy makers such as crisis management. 9 Wicksell (1898) had pioneered the idea that the interest rate should be used to stabilize inflation. Friedman (1970) launched the idea of a rule for money supply growth, which he proposed to be calculated based on macroeconomic fundamentals and financial factors, targeting a 9
New Zealand was the first country to introduce an inflation targeting framework in 1989.
specific level or range of inflation. 10 Kydland and Prescott (1977) designed for democracies easy institutionalized rules, which should be difficult to reverse. This put the stage for monetary policy rules, which were framed by operative, institutional and financial central bank independence (Barro and Gordon 1983) . The German Bundesbank created a corridor for money supply growth to achieve low inflation. After the link between money supply and inflation had proven as instable, inflation targeting combined with central bank independence became the widely accepted frameworks to control consumer price inflation (Taylor 1993) . A model generation was born, where a specific inflation target could be achieved by decisive central bank communication without targeting monetary aggregates (Woodford 2003) .
11
The coincidence of historically low inflation rates in most industrial countries with the introduction of inflation targeting frameworks in a growing number of industrialized countries and emerging market economies was seen as a proof for the success of inflation targeting.
Bernanke (2004) Goodhart (1975; 5) argued that "any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes." In this context the underlying statistical regularity can be the positive relationship between monetary base (money supply) and consumer price inflation as assumed by the quantity equation. Assuming a stable negative relationship between monetary base and interest rate 12 , the Taylor rule and other inflation 10 Friedman (1970, 24) argued that "Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output." 11 Monetary policy according to Woodford (2003) is similar to Wicksell (1898) in that interest rates are used to control inflation. Woodford (2003) calls his models "neo-Wicksellian." However, one considerable difference is that the model framework of Woodford (2003) does not require monetary aggregates, whereas according to Wicksell (1898) these play an important role in the transmission of changes in interest rates to inflation via credit creation. 12 The central banks did usually not change directly the monetary base to influence inflation as often assumed in text books. Moreover, they used the interest rate as an intermediate target of monetary policy making, which has implications on the credit creation of the banking system and therefore on the base money held by commercial banks at the central bank. Base money can be decomposed in several components, out of which targets are based on the quantity equation. This is best formulated in the derivation of the 2% inflation target and the reference value for the money supply growth of the European Central Bank.
13 Indeed, the relationship between money supply or the monetary base and consumer price inflation became increasingly empirically to trace (see Gertler and Hofmann 2016) .
Whereas central banks gradually cut interest rates towards zero and gradually expanded their balance sheets far beyond real GDP growth, inflation rates fell to historically low levels ( Figure 3 , 4, 5). Assuming that monetary policy crisis management has become increasingly visible in asset markets (see section 3.2.), the effect of monetary expansion on consumer price inflation is delayed as it takes a detour via asset markets. If unconventional monetary policy causes a rise in asset prices (instead of consumer prices), wealth effects will still stimulate demand for only open market operations are directly controlled by the central bank (see Disyatat 2008) . Autonomous factors as important components of base money such as standing facilities or the demand for coins and notes in circulation can not be directly influenced by the central bank. Therefore, the reserve holdings of the commercial banks at the central bank tend to be in the short-term independent from the interest rate decisions of the central bank. However, in the medium term central banks influence the monetary base via the impact of its interest rate decisions on economic activity. If the central bank cuts (lifts) interest rates, under normal conditions, the commercial banks' credit provision to the private sector will increase (fall) and therefore the demand for base money will grow (fall) as well. Since money market rates have reached the zero bound in most industrialized countries, the monetary bases (or the size of the central bank balance sheets) have become the direct instrument of monetary policy making. 13 The European Central Bank assumed the average real growth rate of the euro area to be 2% and the change in the velocity of money to be 0.5% per year. Given an inflation target of 2%, this implied a reference value for money supply growth of 4.5%. After the turn of the millennium up to the European financial and debt crisis the reference value for money supply growth was mostly missed by far, while the inflation target of close to 2% was mainly achieved. For this reason and because the connection between money supply and inflation had proved to be empirically hardly traceable, money supply growth as a reference for monetary policy decisions was stepwise discarded and moved from the first to the second pillar of the European Central Bank's monetary policy strategy in 2003. 14 The velocity of money is assumed to be constant. consumer goods as some people feel richer. However, this increase in consumer prices is delayed, what implies a growing time lag before the inflation target is hurt following a monetary expansion.
If redistributive effects cause a rise in demand for mainly luxury goods (see section 4.3), which are not included or underrepresented in the predefined consumer baskets, then only substitution effects between the various product groups can result in more inflation. The monetary policy transmission towards higher inflation is delayed even further. The relationship between the monetary base and inflation can be postponed to an extent that inflation will not rise noticeably until a considerable bubble has already built up in one or another segment of national or international asset markets. If the central bank then lifts its interest rate in an effort to curb the looming inflation, the bubble will burst. The financial crisis dampens inflation again.
The now increasingly unchallenged insight that monetary policy has become increasingly visible in asset markets (see section 3.2), may hinge on a structural change in the transmission of monetary policy. The financial sector as a group of rational economic agents -which has a core role in the transmission of monetary policy -may have changed in the spirit of Lucas (1976) its behavior in response to the introduction of the monetary policy rules. In the case of a monetary expansion additional liquidity is provided by the central bank to a set of financial institutions, which decide as so-called primary dealers about the allocation of the additional funds. 15 The traditional perception of the monetary policy is that the additional liquidity is transferred -supported by lower interest rates -in form of additional credit to households and enterprises. A growing credit volume is linked to increasing profits of commercial banks.
Additional consumer credits lead to additional demand for consumer goods and -given full capacities or rigid supply -to rising prices.
If enterprises anticipate the growing demand for consumer goods, they will invest more to expand their production capacities. For this purpose, the resources have to be shifted first from the consumption goods sector to the investment goods sector, what implies less supply of consumer goods and therefore further rising prices. If households expect growing inflation (and free capacities on the labor market are depleted) trade unions will bid for higher wages.
Higher wages will trigger higher prices. Once inflation rises (or is anticipated to rise), the inflation targeting framework will force the central bank to tighten money supply to tame inflation. The resulting increase in interest rates will force the commercial banks to tighten credit supply. Investment and consumption will slow down, which reduces demand on labor markets and therefore puts a ceiling on wage and price pressure. During the resulting downturn the profits of financial institutions will decline as credit volumes shrink and some debtors default. If rational commercial banks anticipate the monetary tightening in the case of rising inflation, they may funnel the additional liquidity provided by the central bank to the financial sector, for instance in form of real estate financing and financing of other asset purchases (e.g. stocks and raw materials). Then, asset prices instead of consumer prices will increase (see citation by Schumpeter (1912) to an insurance mechanism for losses on financial investment (and speculation).
The upshot is, that there is an incentive to circumvent the monetary policy rule as a control mechanism against undue credit growth, because the profits of financial institutions grow fast during the upswing. Even if the bursting of the bubble is anticipated, the incentive for a single rational financial agent not to participate in the boom is low. The personal income flows during the financial boom would be substantially smaller compared to financial agents participating in the boom. In case of financial crisis, monetary policy crisis management can be expected to prevent asset prices from falling or to push up alternative investment classes to compensate the losses. 17 Therefore, even in the case of financial crisis, the income flows of prominent financial markets agents are likely to remain high (see section 4.3).
16 This is an important innovation of this paper and a deviation from Wicksell (1898 Wicksell ( , 1936 , who did primarily not address stock markets. Nevertheless, Wicksell (1936: 95) During the upswing in particular the upper management (as agent) can privatize major parts of the (speculative) profits, for instance in form of bonuses. Once the bubbles burst, the resulting losses during the downswing may be shifted to the owners of the financial institution (stock holders), i.e. the principal (bail in). Alternatively, the costs of the rescue measures are shifted to the public sector directly via public bail outs Through this mechanism an ultra-loose monetary policy can lead to falling -rather than increasing -inflation as measured in the usual consumer price indices for at least four reasons. Firstly, in many cases central bank interest rate cuts and the expansion of the monetary base were/are accompanied by excesses in real estate markets and go usually along with booms in the construction industry. The impact of fast increasing real estate prices on consumer price indices remains limited. Although prices for new rentals (in particular in centers of economic activity) may rise, housing market regulations dampen any transmission from rising real estate prices to average home rental rates. As rents represent housing in the consumer price baskets, the transmission of fast growing house prices to consumer price baskets is weak. In the long term the creation of additional capacities can dampen home rental rates after the burst of the bubbles.
Secondly, low interest rates constitute lower costs for credit. In the case of boom phases in the stock markets they also cause favorable conditions to raise capital via stock emission. This contributes to lower costs of enterprises, in particular large enterprises, which can issue stocks. Bearing in mind the significant increase in global competition following the entry of China and many Central and Eastern European countries into the world economy, the declining financing costs are likely to have contributed to lower prices in the product markets.
Thirdly, financial institutions can use the additional liquidity to purchase government bonds, meaning that government spending will continue to grow. A shift in demand from the private to the public sector and therefore price increases of goods consumed by the public sector is not reflected by the established consumer price indices. Fourthly, the distributional effects of boom-and-crisis cycles in the financial markets indirectly bring about income repression for major parts of the population (see section 4.3). This dampens consumption among those sections of the population, whose consumption habits are modelled in the consumer price indices of central banks.
and/or indirectly via monetary expansion. This reduces the incentives for the principal to take sanctions against the agent. This is equivalent to the circumvention of the liability principle of market economies.
Crisis Management and Financial Market Exuberance
The gradual monetary expansion of central banks in the course of crisis management has come along with a gradual growth of financial markets, as the asymmetric monetary expansion provided an incentive to expand debt at lower interest rates. 18 In the US, the size of the financial and real sectors (which are strongly intertwined) as a share of the total economy increased from 11% in 1980 to 18% by 2015 (Figure 7 ). 19 Together with the size of financial markets also volatility seems to have increased. According to Mises (1949: 572) With the benefit of hindsight, a wave of wandering bubbles (see Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008) can be identified. In Figure 8 the wave of wandering bubbles starts in Japan in the mid 1980s, when Japan was forced to let appreciate the Japanese yen to cure the US-Japanese trade imbalance (Sept. 1985 Plaza Agreement). As the strong yen appreciation by about 50% against the dollar pushed the export dependent Japanese economy into a deep recession, the Bank of Japan cut interest rates from 8% (Sept. 1985) to a by then historical low of 3.5% (Sept. 1987) . While the eased financing conditions facilitated investment to reduce production costs of the export enterprises, the cheap liquidity also nurtured an unprecedented speculation boom in stock and real estate markets, which peaked in December 1989 (see Nikkei in Figure   8 ).
As in the overinvestment theories, the Bank of Japan pricked the bubble by increasing interest rates, when it started to regard the development on stock and real estate markets as But instead of expanding credit to the domestic economy, the ailing Japanese banks provided credit to banks and enterprises being active in a set of Southeast Asian economies. Stock and real estate bubbles in the Southeast Asian (now miracle) economies emerged, as represented by the Malaysian stock market in Figure 8 . In June 1997, the speculation boom in Southeast Asia finally turned sour as international capital markets had lost confidence in the regional boom. During the Asian crisis, which was accompanied by the Japanese financial crisis (because Japanese banks and export enterprises were strongly engaged in the region), capital flows returned to the save haven of the industrialized countries. With the central banks of the large industrialized countries having responded to the Asian crisis and Japanese financial crisis (as well as to buoyant capital inflows) by interest rate cuts, bubbles in the so-called dotcom market emerged (see NASDAQ in Figure 8 ).
The bursting of the dotcom bubbles in December 2000 triggered new interest rate cuts in the large industrialized countries, which built the breeding ground for a set of new, ever larger bubbles. Figure 8 shows the Case-Shiller Index as a proxy for the US-subprime boom.
Beyond the US, in set in European periphery countries (including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the Baltics, Iceland, etc.) stock and real estate bubbles emerged, which were accompanied by private and public spending booms. 20 Given the low interest level in the US, also China was faced with speculative capital inflows, which significantly contributed to a build-up of overcapacities in the Chinese (export-)industry and the real estate sector (Schnabl 2016 ). The Chinese boom -which triggered growing demand of China for raw materialswas accompanied by hiking prices for oil, gas and raw materials.
The outbreak of the US subprime crisis was followed by crises in the periphery countries of 
Growth and Distribution Effects of Monetary Policy Crisis Management
The upshot is that from a global perspective the monetary policy crisis management of today is the breeding ground for the overinvestment and speculation booms of tomorrow, and the financial crises of the day after tomorrow. Whereas in the face of crisis, monetary policy crisis management helps to stabilize financial markets in the short-term, it has a growing number and scale of unintended side effects in the form of quasi unpredictable bubbles in some -20 See Schnabl and Wollmershäuser (2013) on the asymmetric effects of ECB monetary expansion on different parts of the European Monetary Union (and beyond). 21 On the overinvestment boom in China see Schnabl (2016) . more or less random -segments of international financial markets. Once bubbles have burst, in many cases a lasting stagnation is observed, which can be attributed to two main reasons. First, as argued by Koo (2003) balance sheet recession puts a drag on growth. Declining stock, real estate prices and consumer prices increase the real value of debt. As the value of collateral of credit declines, households and enterprises are forced to curtail consumption and investment to reduce their debt burden. Such balance sheet recessions are argued to be longer and deeper than usual recessions also because the financial sector is strongly damaged (Reinhart and Reinhart 2010, Dell'Arricia et al. 2012) . They are associated with permanent output losses due the pre-crisis overestimation of potential output, the misallocation of capital stock and labor during the upswing and the oppressive effects of debt and capital overhangs during the downswing. The implicit consequence is that growth will recover, once the adjustment process to real debt is finished.
Focusing on the notion of misallocation of capital sections 4.1. and 4.2 are extensions of the theories of Mises (1912) and Hayek (1929) 
Declining Productivity Gains
The most important argument in favor of bail outs of financial institutions during crisis is the potential credit crunch (Koo 2003) . When asset price bubbles burst, bad loans in the banking sector increase, as debtors are rendered over-indebted. The resulting shrinkage of equity forces banks to tighten credit to the private sector. As the resulting credit crunch threatens to extend the crisis to the enterprise sector (with a respective rise in unemployment), interest cuts and low-interest (no-cost) liquidity provision by the central bank shall stabilize both the financial and enterprise sector (Posen 2000) . As the bad-loan problem in the financial sector is contained, contagion effects to financial institutions and enterprises are prevented. However, a highly expansionary monetary policy during crisis -which is not followed by a symmetric monetary tightening -leads in the long term to a quasi-nationalization of money and credit markets.
In money markets -given growing distrust among banks during crisis -interbank lending of commercial banks is substituted by borrowing from and depositing at the central bank. The zero interest-rate policy perpetuates this situation, because profit margins in money markets are compressed (McKinnon 2012) . Banks with excess liquidity no longer have any incentive to supply overnight credit. Even if banks requiring liquidity were to offer higher interest rates to create a supply, the loan is unlikely to be granted, because offering high interest rates signals higher risk. 22 As a result, the private supply in money markets is substituted by the central bank. Banks with excess liquidity invest with the central bank.
In the credit markets the zero interest-rate policy contributes to a credit crunch, because the low-or zero-interest rate policy is equivalent to a subsidy for the enterprise sector, which is under usual circumstances an aggregated demander on the lending market. Especially for large companies that can issue their own securities and stocks, financing costs drop. The declining costs of obtaining capital give rise to additional profits for -in particular largeenterprises, which becomes visible in the form of increasing corporate savings. 23 The demand for loans declines and outstanding credit is repayed. (Increasingly) own shares are bought back, because alternative investment categories (bank deposits, government bonds) render low yields due to the asymmetric monetary policy crisis management. This is equivalent to a market failure as in Ackerlof (1970) . 23 It is therefore difficult to provide sound empirical evidence for the hypothesis of the global liquidity glut as launched by Bernanke (2005) . The assumed structural increase in net household savings because of aging societies cannot be observed in any of the ageing countries with surplus savings (over investments) (see upper panel of Figure 10 ). The increase in aggregate net savings surpluses in these countries (relative to investments) is rather due to the increase in corporate savings (especially resulting from declining financing costs) and the fall in investments. 24 This increases the profit per share and therefore -in many cases -the bonus payments for the upper management (see section 4.3). If the larger, less risky companies withdraw from the loan portfolios of commercial banks, the average risk in the banks' loan portfolios increases. In this case loans to comparatively highrisk small and medium-sized enterprises have to be restricted. In particular, new and risky investment projects by small and medium enterprises will tend to remain unfinanced. If the banks are more strictly regulated as a result of financial crisis, they need to accumulate more equity, which is an additional incentive to restrict lending to higher-risk companies. As lending to the government is widely acknowledged to be riskless (because of respective regulations such as Basle III and because of asymmetric monetary policy crisis management), lending to the private sector tends to be substituted by lending to the public sector.
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In contrast, credit to enterprises and households having been granted before the crisis has a high probability of being extended despite low credit worthiness. To remain in the market, banks in trouble tend to disguise their bad-loan problem by overlooking precarious business situations of enterprises. For Japan -where the (close to) zero interest rate period persists the longest -Sekine, Kobayashi and Saita (2003) This implies a structural change in the nature of banking business. Traditional banking involves accepting deposits with a positive rate of return and lending that capital, in the form of loans, to businesses and households at higher interest rates. Banks fulfil an intermediary function making an assessment about the future returns on investments. Projects with higher expected returns than the prevailing interest rate are financed at a given interest rate. Projects with lower expected returns (with a high probability of default) are rejected. By having accumulated the know-how to make this assessment properly, the banking sector has been traditionally playing a crucial role in the allocation function of the interest rate, separating investment projects with higher marginal productivity from those with lower marginal productivity.
(see section 4.3).
If the banking system is, however, no longer subject to strict budget constraints due quasiunlimited central bank liquidity provision in the course of monetary policy crisis management, the allocation function of the interest rate is undermined. Kornai (1993) spoke of "Soft Budget Constraints" in the case of the Central and Eastern European planned economies: Since unemployment was politically undesirable, non-profitable companies were kept alive by covering their losses via the state-controlled banking systems. Quian and Xu (1998) showed for China that such soft-budget constraints made it harder to separate profitable from unprofitable projects as the selection mechanism of the market was undermined. Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) show for Japanese companies that under zero interest rate policies profits became dependent on cheap central bank liquidity provision.
Thus, while the monetary policy crisis management successfully helped keeping unemployment low, it went globally along with declining average productivity increases of firms ( Figure 10 ). Similar developments seem to take place in other industrialized countries, in particular since the advent of zero interest rate policies (see Figure 10 for the US and Germany). Barnett et al. (2014) demonstrate that since 2007 the United Kingdom has experienced a significant drop in productivity growth among businesses. Cardarelli and Lusinyan (2015) show for the US that total-factor productivity has dropped significantly since the turn of the millennium. Gopinath et al. (2015) provide respective empirical evidence for the Southern European countries since the outbreak of the European debt and financial crisis.
The upshot is that monetary policy crisis management delays or prevents the structural adjustment process during crisis as stressed by Schumpeter (1912) : the cleansing process, which is regarded in the monetary overinvestment theories as a prerequisite for a sustained recovery, is postponed. Investments which would have to be dismantled at Wicksell's (1898) Borio (2014) , who identifies capital overhang as a major determinant of post-bubble crisis.
Impact on Investment and Growth
Given gradually declining productivity increases asymmetric monetary policy crisis management can affect investment in fixed assets negatively for several reasons. First, resources are bound in investment projects with low productivity, whereas new investment is discouraged by the ailing banking sector (see section 4.1). Second, because the ample liquidity provision in the course of monetary policy crisis management prevents asset prices from further falling (or drives prices upwards in alternative asset classes), monetary policy crisis management constitutes an implicit insurance mechanism for investment and/or speculation in financial markets. In contrast, enterprises have to bear the risk of investment in new products or production processes without any public insurance mechanism. Therefore, enterprises have incentives to substitute investment in real investment projects by financial investment, including repurchases of own stocks (see section 4.2.).
27 26 In the monetary overinvestment theories, too favourable refinancing conditions during the upswing cause additional investment projects with lower expected returns to be financed. The marginal and average efficiency of investments decreases. During downturn and crisis, investment projects with low internal rates of return are cancelled. The marginal and average efficiency of investments increases. In the long term, the average efficiency of investment is therefore mainly constant. In contrast von Weizsäcker (2015) , Summers (2014) as well as Laubach and Williams (2014) assume a gradual secular decline of the average return on investment, what they assume to be matched with a secular decline of what they call natural interest rate. 27 From a private sector perspective, the average return on financial investments will seem relatively high if potential losses are counteracted by the central bank. In aggregate, however, the overall returns need to be adjusted for possible state subsidies. This is for example the case when banks are recapitalized with public money, or the costs of bailouts in the course of central bank crisis management become visible e.g. in the Third, if the financial crisis is transformed into a sustained crisis in which there is no limit to the central bank's government bond purchases, the likelihood increases that private investments is substituted by public investments and/or government consumption. 28 For instance, after the Japanese bubble had burst in December 1989, numerous Keynesian economic stimulus programs were implemented (Yoshino and Mizoguchi 2010, Fischer and Schnabl 2016) . Figure 11 shows that gross investment in Japan as a share of GDP declined from 32% since the bursting of the bubble in the year 1990 to 20% in the year 2014, whereas government spending as a share of GDP rose from 13% to 19%. Assuming that public investments have a lower marginal efficiency than private investments, the average efficiency of investments has further decreased. Source: Cabinet Office (Japan).
In the neoclassical growth theory, growth is explained by the accumulation of capital towards a long-term equilibrium between investment and depreciation (steady-state economy). The form of higher inflation or the recapitalization of the central bank. From a macroeconomic perspective, returns on speculative investments in the financial markets are therefore significantly lower, or even negative. 28 As proposed by Koo (2003) in the face of balance sheet recession. steady state is based on the assumption of a declining marginal efficiency of capital when the stock of capital increases (Solow 1956 , Swan 1956 ). Only, through innovation and technological progress, which can be interpreted as increasing productivity, can growth be positive in the long term (Solow 1957) . In this framework, an asymmetric monetary policy crisis management negatively affects growth if it has a negative impact on innovation and productivity gains. Source: OECD, Cabinet Office (Japan), BEA, Eurostat. Three-country arithmetic averages. Leibenstein (1966) regards incentives and motivation as major determinants of a concept of efficiency which goes beyond allocative efficiency (assuming constant production costs in different types of markets such as polypolies in contrast to monopolies) (X-(in)efficiency).
Businesses do not realize all possible efficiency gains when competition is limited. Such Xinefficiency can arise when asymmetric monetary policy crisis management results in the creation and cementation of structural distortions. 29 In the course of asymmetric monetary 29 On the impact of credit booms on the allocation of labor and productivity dynamics see also Borio et al. (2016) .
policy crisis management, liquidity and loans are provided increasingly independently from efficiency criteria, causing the average productivity of zombie firms supported by zombie banks to decline. Loan provision to new dynamic enterprises becomes more restrictive. A reduced pace of innovation, which according to Hayek (1968) is triggered by lower levels of competition, have a negative impact on productivity gains.
By tying resources to sectors with low or negative productivity gains, in the context of the Solow-Swan model a negative allocative effect is created which results from declining average productivity (defined as output per unit of labor). From the perspective of companies, average costs will rise ceteris paribus. At the macroeconomic level, fewer goods and services are produced with a constant amount of labor. Since declining output also entails a decrease in savings per worker, this results in an additional negative growth effect because households make fewer savings available for investment.
A further determinant favoring lower growth is declining household savings as shown in Figure 10 and, coupled with this, declining investments, which result from reduced incentives for people to save. The transmission channel from monetary policy crisis management towards reduced savings activity is financial repression, which drives down returns on lowrisk investments. Real household savings fall as shown in Figure 9 , meaning that real investments also fall and in turn production opportunities increase less. 30 Once depreciations exceed gross investment, the result is a downward spiral of declining returns on capital, households saving less, declining investments and declining output. As seen in Figure 12 , real growth rates in the large industrialized countries are gradually falling together with investments as a share of GDP.
Redistributive Effects via Financial and Real Wage Repression
Asymmetric monetary policy crisis management has redistribution effects, which work through a large number of diverse transmission channels (see Hoffmann and Schnabl 2026b Such redistribution effects in favor of the financial sector are for instance visible in the United States, which is the country with the largest and most developed financial markets. As shown in Figure 13 until the mid-1980s the wages of industrial sector workers grew faster than in the financial sector. Since the mid-1980s -with the start of the asymmetric monetary policy crisis management -financial sector employees are benefitting from higher wage increases. This was even the case in financial market crises, during which industrial workers' wages declined more than in the financial sector. Financial sector executives may benefit more than other employees from windfall profits during speculative upswings, because one-off dividends (bonuses) are more common at this level. An important transmission channel from asymmetric monetary policy crisis management to diverging wealth and income is via its impact on asset prices, because assets such as stocks and real estate are unevenly distributed among different wealth and income groups. If an asymmetric monetary policy is geared towards pushing up asset prices, it redistributes in favor of high-income groups, which tend to hold these asset groups over-proportionally. This is suggested by Figure 13 of which the left axis shows price trends on the US and Japanese stock markets (NYSE and Nikkei), whereas the right axis plots the share of the top 1% of incomes as a proportion of total incomes of the US (including income from capital). The rise of the share of top 1% incomes as a share of total incomes goes along with the rise of Japanese stock prices during the 1980s. Since 1987, when Alan Greenspan took office as
Chairman of the Federal Reserve and initiated a monetary policy aimed primarily at stabilizing the financial markets, the share of the top 1% of incomes in the US has risen from around 13% to almost 22% of total income together with US stock prices. 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 In contrast, returns of riskless assets, which are mainly held by middle and lower-income groups are depressed by the asymmetric monetary policy crisis management.
32 Among other things, the returns on low-risk investments such as fixed-income savings and government bonds are lowered towards zero nominally and -given moderate inflation -into negative territory in real terms. Figure 15 shows the gradual decline of returns on low-risk investment classes such as government bonds and bank deposits in the large industrialized countries. This financial repression also changes the traditional banking business, as lending-deposit spreads are compressed and commercial banks are charged negative interest rates on their deposits at the central bank (Japan, euro area, Switzerland, etc.). In addition to financial repression, real wage repression can occur when post-bubble crisis undermines the bargaining power of employees in the public and the private sector, while at the same time monetary policy crisis management leads to declining productivity gains, which are the basis for real wage increases. Financial crises (and growing public expenditure 32 Low and middle-income groups are assumed to hold more low-risk financial assets, because they perceive investments in the asset markets to be high-risk.
33
For more on financial repression see Hoffmann and Zemanek (2012) .
obligations triggered by exuberant boom phases in the financial markets) drive public debt upwards. 34 During the course of crisis tax revenues structurally decline, while payment obligations can not be reduced at the same speed. To curtail the expenditure the public sector is forced to curtail wages. The signalling effects of public wage agreements as well as gloomy business expectations cause public austerity to be followed by wage moderation in the private sector. Wages are driven down especially in those segments of the labor market where qualification and bargaining power are low. Such nominal wage repression has been observed in most countries suffering from financial crises. Usually young employees, who enter the labor markets, will be more exposed to nominal wage repression than older cohorts, whose contracts remain fixed. This is very clearly visible in Japan. As shown in Figure 16 the average real wage level has fallen steadily since the Japanese financial market crisis (1998). Given mainly stable prices, the decline of real wages is mainly achieved via declining average nominal wages. In Europe, too, nominal wage repression in particular for the younger generation has increasingly become a reality since the outbreak of the European financial and debt crisis. 35 Real wage repression cum financial repression can in turn be seen as important determinants of what leads to weak private demand of large proportions of the populations. If this is anticipated by enterprises, investment will remain sluggish. 36 In a nutshell: the negative redistributive and real wage effects, which were traditionally widely ascribed to consumer price inflation, are now achieved indirectly -i.e. without consumer price inflation -via boom-and-crisis cycles in the financial markets.
Persistence of Low Interest Rate Policies and Policy Implications
An asymmetric monetary policy crisis management has self-reinforcing effects, if it encourages -directly and indirectly -an increase in national debt as observed in most industrialized countries. The higher are the levels of government debt, the higher is the pressure on central banks to keep key interest rates low and to continue purchases of government bonds via unconventional monetary policies. Otherwise, the interest rate burden of over-indebted governments would become unsustainable. The governments would be forced into politically unpopular structural reforms and spending cuts.
Furthermore, in the course of the monetary policy crisis management central banks tend to hold increasingly (potentially) bad assets in their balance sheets. As any monetary tightening would reduce the expected value of these assets, central banks would loose equity and therefore in the long term would necessitate recapitalization. As this would further undermine their independence, there is an incentive to continue the asymmetric monetary policy crisis management. Given the widely used inflation targets the persistence of unconventional monetary policies is technically possible, because monetary policy crisis management based on ultra-expansionary monetary policy has -due to Goodhart's law -no or a negative impact on consumer price inflation. 35 Germany is currently an exemption for two reasons. First, productivity increases, which have been pre-crisis exported to other European countries, are now partially repatriated, what has allowed for real wage increases since the outbreak of the crisis. Second, with the European Central Bank keeping monetary conditions very loose as crisis management for the Southern European crisis countries, a real estate bubble and export boom is fueled in Germany, which encourages real wages increases. 36 The negative demand effect of declining real incomes is partially offset by declining saving of the household sector, in particular of the younger generations.
As described by Hayek (1929 Hayek ( , 1937 Hayek ( , 1944 the Great Depression and the following stagnation of the 1930s were the outcome of too loose monetary policies, the resulting undue credit growth and intervention spirals in response to the crisis. In this paper it was shown that the current "secular stagnation" can be seen as the outcome -and not as the origin -of crisis management, which is based on excessive low-cost liquidity provision by central banks. To reverse the vicious circle of monetary policy crisis management and declining growth a timely exit from the ultra-low monetary policy is necessary to reconstitute the allocation and signalling function of the interest rate as well as the principle of liability in financial markets.
Despite negative growth effects in short-term (as non-productive investment has to be dismantled) by slowly, but irrevocably raising interest rates, growth could be restored. The incentives for financial market speculation would be reduced, as risk would become priced again based on market forces. The resulting cleansing process in financial markets would set free capital and labor for real investment, which was previously bound in sectors with low productivity. The increasing interest rates would provide an incentive for more household saving to finance growing investment. The marginal and average efficiency of investments would increase again. Aggregated saving and investments as well as innovation would be strengthened.
Growing debt-servicing costs would force governments to consolidate their spending by pushing forward structural reforms. Parts of the public economic activity would have to be privatized, which would contribute to an increasing average productivity of previously public investment. By substituting public consumption and investment by private investment, the average efficiency of investment would increase. Fiscal consolidation combined with rising interest rates would encourage banks to restore their traditional business model. The banking sector would return to its very task to finance investment projects with the highest expected returns (instead of buying government bonds). This would lead to pressure on enterprises to come up with innovative investment projects. A higher degree of X-Efficiency would be reached.
Productivity gains would allow real wages to grow again. This would be even more the case for the middle and low income classes if the adverse redistribution effects of boom and bust in financial markets would be eliminated. A growing purchasing power of broad parts of the middle and lower income classes would help to fully use the newly created capacities.
Growing income levels would contribute to higher tax revenues for the state, which could be used to reduce public debt. The political pressure towards regulation, price and rent controls and redistribution of wealth etc. would be eased. A higher degree of economic freedom would help to create sustainable growth and to secure welfare for all parts of the society. This would all help to contain political polarization, which has been favored by the increasing income inequalities.
